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How do countries of origin engage migrants and diasporas? Multiple actors and 
comparative perspectives 
 
Maria Koinova & Gerasimos Tsourapas 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The relationship of states to populations beyond their borders is of increasing interest to 
those seeking to understand the international politics of migration. This introduction to the 
special issue of International Political Science Review on diasporas and sending states 
provides an overview of existing explanations for why states reach out to diasporas and 
migrants abroad and problematizes in important ways the idea that the sending state is a 
unitary actor. It highlights the need to examine the extraterritorial behaviour of agents 
within countries of origin, such as parties, bureaucracies and non-state actors, and to 
account for why and how their outreach differs. This entails looking at how outreach is 
conditioned by a state’s sovereignty and capacity, type of nationalism, and regime 
character. This special issue starts a new conversation by delving deeper into the 
motivations of agents within countries of origin, and how their outreach is determined by 
the states and regimes in which they are embedded. 
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Introduction 
 
In April 2017, in a divisive constitutional referendum, a slim majority of voters endorsed 
enhanced presidential powers for Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdoğan. During the 
campaign, an important non-state actor became visible from abroad: the Turkish diaspora. 
For months, Erdoğan and his governing party solicited Turks in Western Europe to support 
his plan to increase presidential powers. In March, Erdoğan even had a diplomatic row with 
the Dutch government, which was objecting to Turkish officials holding rallies among 
migrants on its territory. Germany and Denmark supported the Dutch government; Erdoğan 
retaliated by calling them ‘Nazis’ and promising they would ‘pay for this’. At that point 
campaigning in the diaspora shifted from ‘low politics’ of a contested domestic issue to ‘high 
politics’ of strained relations between states. Extraterritorial campaigning bore fruit. In 
European Union (EU) countries with Turkish descendants from the ‘guestworker’ generation 
of the 1960s and 1970s – such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and 
Norway – the diaspora supported Erdoğan: the diaspora in the rest of the EU, North 
America, Australia and Eurasia did not (Yeni Şafak, 2017). A nation divided at home became 
divided abroad. 
 
The importance of the diaspora in Turkey’s constitutional referendum is not an isolated 
occurrence. Latin American politicians often campaign in the United States of America, 
home to millions of Latinos. Even when they are not fully enfranchised, or when casting an 
absentee vote is difficult, they are considered important for the resources they can lend to 
campaigns or the influence they wield over family members who can vote domestically. 
Overseas voters are also important for democracies that have emerged from conflict, such 
as Croatia and Kosovo; or have seen many citizens disperse across Europe, such as Romania 
and Bulgaria. 
 
The politics of sending states and migration is attracting increased attention (Adamson and 
Demetriou, 2007; Collyer, 2013; De Haas, 2007; Délano and Gamlen, 2014; Fitzgerald, 2006; 
Gamlen et al., 2013; Hollifield, 2012; Kapur, 2010; Koinova, 2012, 2018a; Meseguer and 
Burgess, 2014; Mylonas 2012; Naujoks, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Ragazzi, 2014; 
Tsourapas, 2015, 2018a; Waterbury, 2010). 
 
Many important questions remain little explored: 
 
- Why do some sending states seek their migrant and diasporas abroad and others 
not?  
- Why do some of them treat certain emigrant and diaspora groups differently from 
others?  
- How do governments, parties and bureaucracies differ in engagement? 
- How do diaspora institutions evolve over time? 
- Does engagement vary for the sending states of various regimes? 
 
These questions are at the core of this special issue, together with a novel approach to 
understanding the variety of actors that engage migrants and diasporas abroad. Beyond 
policies targeting remittances and micro-financing, the articles address state sovereignty, 
nationalism and political regimes, soft power considerations, specific strategies and modes 
of engaging governments, parties, bureaucracies and non-state actors. Globalisation does 
not empower sending states evenly across the globe; nor do institutions and non-state 
actors in weak and strong states behave similarly. These articles open the ‘black box’ of the 
sending state through middle-range theorizing based on comparisons from a variety of 
world regions. 
 
Prevalent explanations: Why do sending states engage diasporas abroad? 
 
Scholars have put forward a cluster of utilitarian, identity-based, governance and socio-
spatial explanations of the relationship between sending states and their diasporas abroad. 
These perspectives, while sometimes overlapping, each provide a core rationale for sending-
state engagement. Utilitarian explanations see diasporas as sources of material power. 
Diasporas are considered important for attracting remittances, accounting for over 15% of 
some developing countries’ GDP, as in Armenia, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Tajikistan and others. Sending migrants abroad, including as guest-workers, is often a ‘safety 
valve’ against unemployment in cash-strapped domestic economies (Guarnizo, 1998; 
Tsourapas, 2015, 2018a). Remittances sustain households and reduce poverty. Sending 
states seek to attract diaspora entrepreneurs as direct investors in small, medium and large 
enterprises (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Diasporas are also sought for philanthropy (Brinkerhoff, 
2008; Sidel, 2003), homeland tourism (Coles and Timothy, 2004) and professional expertise, 
especially in the engineering, technology and medical sectors. To counter a ‘brain-drain’, 
sending states seek to attract diaspora returnees or engage them in temporary or virtual 
return programmes if permanent return is not viable (Tsourapas, 2015). 
 
A utilitarian perspective also sheds light on how migrants and diasporas may be 
instrumentalised for sending states’ domestic or international political agendas. Diasporas 
can lobby foreign governments and international organizations (Adamson and Demetriou, 
2007; Shain and Barth, 2003; Koinova, 2012). Migrants, refugees and diasporas can also be 
pawns in interstate disputes. Sending and transit states may create ‘migration crises’ to 
force concessions from their adversaries (Greenhill, 2010) or employ the status of 
vulnerable migrants in coercive interstate relations (Tsourapas, 2015; 2018a). This cluster of 
explanations demonstrates avenues by which sending states ‘tap into the diaspora’ (Gamlen 
et al., 2013) for economic and political gains. Nevertheless, they are limited by reifying 
realist assumptions, regarding states as unitary sovereign actors, capable of opening and 
closing their economies (Hollifield, 2012), and executing foreign policies without divergence 
among institutions, capacities of statehood and regimes. 
 
Identity-based explanations see diasporas as sources of symbolic power. Sending states seek 
to reproduce a diaspora’s symbolic link to the homeland as an ‘imagined community’ 
(Anderson, 2006). They support schools and curricula for diaspora pupils to study their 
history and language (Koinova, 2018a). They offer homeland visits to maintain their cultural 
heritage (Gamlen et al., 2013). They sponsor commemorative events and ‘diaspora days’ 
(Naujoks, 2013; Tsourapas, 2015), enable trans-border media channels for the specific 
benefit of co-nationals (Waterbury, 2010) and provide personnel and instruction for 
religious institutions in the diaspora (De Haas, 2007). 
 
Identity-based explanations address the ways in which dual and multiple citizenships defy 
traditional understanding of the nation-state as a specific territory. Diaspora members with 
multiple citizenships have rights and obligations in different polities. ‘Transnational 
citizenship’ (Bauböck, 2005) facilitates political engagement through external voting and 
lobbying (Collyer, 2013), maintaining homeland property, and potential interest in return, 
among others. Sending states may foster citizenship abroad in identity-based ways, 
engaging all citizens despite multiple identities, narrow nationalist principles (Koinova 
2018a; Waterbury, 2010), or a combination of these (Bauböck, 2005; Ragazzi, 2014). 
 
Identity-based explanations consider the diaspora as constructed, awakened and re-
engaged through diasporisation or nationalist mobilisation (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007; 
Shain and Barth, 2003). These explanations see two major dimensions to the policies of the 
sending state. The first is promotion of civic versus ethnic nationalism abroad by state and 
sub-state actors seeking to engage certain populations but ignore or exclude others; and the 
second is understanding challenges to the sending state through attention to political 
regimes. Authoritarian regimes are much less tolerant of dual citizenship (Brand, 2014) than 
are democracies. Democracies with relatively highly educated emigration are more likely to 
tolerate dual citizenship; autocracies are more restrictive toward such migrants (Mirilovic, 
2014). How the civic or ethnic dimension of statehood intersects with regime type in these 
engagements has so far lacked scholarly attention. 
 
The third cluster of explanations examines sending-state engagement with diasporas 
through a governance perspective, identifying multiple processes and channels of 
engagement. Sending states can govern migrants and diasporas through bilateral treaties 
and cooperation with international organisations (Gamlen et al., 2013; Hollifield, 2012). 
Embassies abroad can be strongly engaged in such governance processes, whether seeking 
to control populations or support them through various practices. In a Foucauldian 
‘governmentality’ perspective, sending states can be seen as governing through practices 
associated with a neoliberal global order (Ragazzi, 2014). Such practices glorify markets and 
outsource state functions to private actors including diasporas, which need to be 
entrepreneurial, rely on self-help, and be handled through a ‘light-touch managerial 
approach’ (Délano and Gamlen, 2014). 
 
‘Governance’ approaches started growing exponentially with the 2015–2016 global refugee 
crisis and efforts to develop coordination among state and non-state actors to manage 
migration flows. Sending-state activities have been primarily analysed in the context of 
regional and geopolitical dynamics. More recently, sending states have become involved in 
the United Nations Global Compact on Migration, seeking a global framework for migration 
governance through consultation with multiple agents. Empirical discussion of sending 
states and their relationships to refugees in the current crisis is outside the scope of this 
special issue; however, as sending states’ engagement in global governance becomes more 
salient and therefore more scrutinized by a variety of global agents, this special issue 
highlights the need to consider the state not as a unitary actor, but rather as containing 
multiple actors with various agendas conditioned by the state sovereignty and political 
regimes in which they operate. 
 
As for the socio-spatial dimension, few earlier attempts consider how actors within and 
beyond sending states engage migrant and diaspora groups abroad. Within sending states, 
political parties, bureaucracies and non-state actors can diverge from central institutions, 
often engaging with diasporas for partisan and self-preservation reasons (Fitzgerald, 2006). 
Parties can develop overseas branches to mobilise diasporas during elections. Beyond 
sending states, different diasporas can be engaged by the same state according to socio-
positional rationale. Sending states factor in where diasporas are positioned and how they 
are empowered through being embedded or interlinked in a transnational social field 
(Koinova, 2018a). Non-state actors make similar calculations (Adamson and Demetriou, 
2007; Koinova 2012; Lyons and Mandaville, 2010). Sending states may develop multi-tier 
policies targeting different migrants and diaspora groups based on economic and foreign 
policy considerations (Tsourapas, 2015). Building on these accounts, the articles in this issue 
bring new insights into the conditions and mechanisms through which agents within the 
sending state engage with migrants and diasporas. 
 
Theoretical and empirical contributions of this special issue 
 
This special issue builds on the growing understanding that the sending state is not a unitary 
actor. The articles articulate how domestic conditions affect policies of actors and 
institutions within the sending state. In democratic regimes, such actors include political 
parties and civil society actors. In authoritarian contexts, elite strategies develop within the 
ruling regime, focusing particularly on soft power goals. In weak states and transitional 
contexts, non-state actors such as radical groups may have a specific take on diaspora 
engagement, with politics that complement or contradict the central approach of the 
sending state. Sovereign and de facto states may differ in the ways they engage with 
diasporas. A variety of domestic conditions and approaches are theorized here, regarding 
world regions and time periods. 
 
Mainstream International Relations scholarship has discussed the state, its sovereignty and 
capacity, with minimal consideration to the diaspora dimension. Sporadic accounts show 
that diasporas are ‘outside the state’ but ‘inside the people’ (Shain and Barth, 2003), 
without direct overlap between state and national identity (Adamson and Demetriou, 
2007). People challenge state sovereignty through movement across borders, illicit 
trafficking and irregular migration. Challenges are tackled with migration control at the 
national or regional level, including European integration and deportation. Sovereign states 
with the ability to govern territories effectively are considered to have strong capacity. 
States without this ability and considered weak are often subject to contestation by non-
state actors and terrorist groups. Researchers within the ERC Project ‘Diasporas and 
Contested Sovereignty’ have shown that diasporas mobilise differently if the states to which 
they are linked are weak or merely de facto. 1 Carment and Calleja (2017) have also shown 
that state capacity and legitimacy are interlinked when diasporas become engaged with 
weak states. These emerging discussions still focus on diasporas as non-state actors, not on 
sending states and how they reach out abroad. 
 
This special issue takes the field further by demonstrating how state sovereignty and 
capacity are crucial to specific attitudes or policies on the part of agents of the sending 
state. Fragile states have limited institutional capacities and economic resources to develop 
expertise and enforce rules. To compensate for these limitations, they engage diasporas 
abroad to fulfil missing functions and provide remittances to sustain livelihoods. Formal 
remittances and other capital contributions have been crucial to states’ survival. 
 
Many states discussed in this collection are relatively weak – for instance, Egypt, Kosovo, 
Mexico, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Sri Lanka. As Patrick Ireland points 
out, female domestic workers have been a major external source of finance for the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka. These vulnerable populations have become pawns in the global 
market for domestic labour. Sending state response to migrant exploitation abroad has 
generally been weak; civil society organizations – with some independence and influence, as 
in the Philippines – have taken a more proactive role. Burgess and Koinova show that in the 
context of developing countries, diaspora outreach varies according to the objectives of 
ruling governments and parties, and the types of states in which they are embedded. In 
Tsourapas’ analysis, in the ruling military regime of Egypt an authoritarian state 
implemented strategies that reflected its foreign policy agenda. 
 
This special issue also brings new insights to bear on the role of nationalism in diaspora 
engagement. In classic debates, nationalism is considered built on a ‘given’ ethnic identity 
(Connor, 1994), entirely constructed (Brass, 1991), or ‘primarily a political principle that 
holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner, 2008: 1). When 
diasporas are engaged, sending states foster what Csergo and Goldgeier (2004) call ‘trans-
sovereign nationalism’, reproducing the nation via co-nationals abroad without annexing 
territories (see also Mylonas, 2012). Theoretically, sending states could extend policies 
abroad on cosmopolitan principles, but scholarship has so far indicated that it is nationalism 
that conditions outreach to diasporas from within the sending state. The difference 
between civic and ethnic nationalism is important: the former emphasizes belonging to the 
entire state and tolerance for the ethnonational diversity of all its citizens; the latter 
considers blood-connection or roots in an ethnonational community (Ignatieff, 1995). Given 
that diasporas operate in transnational social fields (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004), 
primarily on an ethnonational basis (Koinova, 2018a), actors in sending states that engage 
diasporas on a civic principle need to operate in civic ways, transcending ethnic allegiances 
to particular identity-based groups. 
 
In Eastern Europe, nationalism and contentious minority politics, both markers of the 
postcommunist period, affect formation of diaspora institutions and the ways they 
approach their diasporas. Diasporas have been engaged with exclusively on a national basis 
in countries that have undergone war: Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo. As Garding 
demonstrates, secessionist conflict made Croatia’s first post-communist government more 
interested in engaging the diaspora in state-building, even if it had designed the institution 
as weak. Serbia’s institutions reached out to the diaspora in more systematic ways after the 
wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, seeking to boost state-building. In Koinova’s account, 
Kosovo’s policymakers and functionaries have also engaged with the diaspora on a 
nationalist principle, strategizing for diaspora involvement in economic development, 
maintenance of identity, and public diplomacy for state recognition. One party has even 
shown a state-challenging approach, and to be advocating irredentism. Even without 
experiencing war during the post-communist period, Bulgaria and Hungary prioritized 
diaspora engagement on ethnic rather than civic principles, while Romania and Poland have 
been more interested in a civic principle, as Waterbury shows. Civil society approaches have 
proven highly important for sendingstate agents in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, as Patrick 
Ireland demonstrates. 
 
Sending-state policies towards diasporas have been challenged by sovereignty issues not 
only from sub-state actors, but also through supranational and regional dynamics. In 
Waterbury’s account, the EU – a supranational institution – has opened its borders for intra-
EU migrants from Eastern Europe, creating difficulties for sending states to engage 
diasporas through traditional mechanisms and more formal transnational networks. A 
regional dynamic is also visible in the Middle East according to Tsourapas, as authoritarian 
regimes promote emigration as an instrument of soft power. 
 
This special issue also offers theoretical insights into the role of multiple actors in different 
political regimes. Current scholarship on democratic regimes focuses primarily on external 
diaspora voting and the importance of liberal regimes, particularly Mexico (Meseguer and 
Burgess, 2014; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010), or considers changes in the relationship 
between diaspora and state as part of the transition from autocratic rule (Collyer, 2013). In 
a key work, Kapur argues that emigration from India enhanced domestic democratization, 
bringing changes in ‘the locus of political power in the state to economic power in the 
private sector and outside India’ (Kapur, 2010: 184). Scholarship on authoritarian regimes’ 
diaspora engagement has already shown that diaspora voting from abroad can take place in 
certain authoritarian polities (Brand, 2014; Collyer, 2013) and that non-democracies are 
much more likely to restrict citizens’ emigration than liberal states. It is unclear to what 
extent migrant and diaspora engagement by democracies and non-democracies differs 
across the globe. Both regime types have shown they can benefit from financial 
remittances, and many emerging democracies actively encourage labour migration (Escribà-
Folch et al., 2015), as do some authoritarian regimes (Tsourapas, 2015, 2018b). 
 
The contributions to this special issue focus on political regimes through a distinct 
perspective: how they condition or provide openings for diaspora engagement by actors 
within the sending state. In Patrick Ireland’s account, civil society organizations were fairly 
strong in the democratic Philippines, seeking protection of vulnerable overseas female 
workers; not so in Sri Lanka, which experienced transition more recently. Koinova shows 
that transition from conflict and authoritarian rule led parties in Kosovo to varied 
approaches to a proposal to introduce special diaspora representation in the national 
assembly. Burgess highlights state-led and party-led outreach on the democratizing 
potential of emigrants in fragile democracies. More open democratic polities such as Mexico 
and the Philippines have led specifically to state-led diaspora outreach. The accounts of 
Waterbury on intra-European migration, and Garding on bureaucracy building and diaspora 
engagement in Croatia and Serbia, focus on a post-communist period after 1990. Finally, 
Tsourapas explicitly engages with authoritarian emigration states, examining political elites’ 
soft power aims as a determining factor shaping in the Egyptian state’s policy towards host 
states in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Beyond issues of statehood and political regimes, the articles are cognisant of historical 
processes that have shaped current sending state diaspora policies. Garding focuses in 
particular on institutional change. Waterbury speaks of legacies of regional ethnic politics 
that became salient after the end of communism, and which have shaped current policies of 
intra-EU engagement. Koinova shows how prior engagement with secessionism and post-
war institution-building determine how political parties in a contested post-conflict state 
operate abroad, regardless whether in government or opposition. Tsourapas situates his 
analysis within a historical period to identify the importance of labour emigration at times of 
interstate conflict, both within the Arab Cold War and the Arab–Israeli conflict. Ireland 
shows that sending state engagement has endured despite critical junctures of 
democratization and war in Sri Lanka. At the same time, the articles of this special issue 
speak to an incipient line of theoretical thought: how the same sending state engages 
different diasporas abroad. Diasporas could be in different states as defined by their 
sovereignty on the map of the world, but relate to their sending states through an 
‘interstitial space’ both external and internal to the agents involved. Koinova and Waterbury 
show that the context in which diasporas are embedded and their international position – 
whether theorized in political, geographic or socio-spatial terms – play an important role in 
sending state policies. Similarly, Tsourapas examines how foreign policy objectives may lead 
to a sending state’s selective engagement with specific migrant populations according to 
their skill level, at the expense of others. 
 
Beyond contributing to common theoretical themes, the articles bring methodological rigor 
to bear, develop novel typologies, and ground arguments in comparative empirical 
evidence. They are also based on original archival and interview-based material gathered in 
multiple languages, and through fieldwork in different parts of the globe. The articles draw 
evidence from the Americas, Asia, Balkans, Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa, 
and contribute to an understanding of regional variations. 
 
Individual contributions. The individual articles open new avenues for the study of 
extraterritorial diaspora engagement of parties in government and opposition (Burgess and 
Koinova); interaction between global demands of neoliberalism and local civil society 
(Ireland); authoritarian emigration states and their soft power strategies (Tsourapas); intra-
EU politics (Waterbury); and evolution of diaspora institutions (Garding). 
 
Ireland’s ‘The limits of sending-state power: The Philippines, Sri Lanka and female migrant 
domestic workers’ (2018) investigates why Sri Lanka and the Philippines, both associated 
with exporting domestic labour abroad, formulate different policies towards ‘their’ female 
migrant domestic workers. Process tracing and qualitative data collection are employed to 
construct a most-similar case comparison between the Sri Lankan and Philippine defence of 
these workers. State responses depend on the level of gender equality, the nature of civil 
society organizations, and their response to worker exploitation when states make efforts to 
compete in a lucrative global market for domestic workers and their remittances. A stock of 
workers with highly valued human capital, a stronger civil society, and greater gender equity 
compel and enable the Philippine state to adopt a more assertive approach than its Sri 
Lankan counterpart in defending overseas workers (Ireland, 2018). 
 
Waterbury’s ‘Caught between nationalism and transnationalism: How Central and East 
European states respond to East-West emigration’ (2018) seeks to explain the political and 
policy responses to the large waves of post-1990 migration. The policy responses to 
emigration from Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland have been shaped and constrained 
by political and institutional structures driven by these states’ relationships to populations 
of historical kin in neighbouring states and, in some cases, to internal minority communities. 
Differing responses to intra-EU emigration depended in large part on where the intra-EU 
emigrants fit within the politics of belonging. The post-communist politics of external 
engagement with ethnic diasporas and internal struggles over national identity privileged or 
excluded specific subsets of the citizenry abroad. Waterbury analyses and compares the 
institutional position of intra-EU emigrants within the states’ diaspora management 
frameworks, and the degree of integration of recent emigrants into a transnational political 
rights framework encompassing dual citizenship and external voting (Waterbury, 2018). 
 
Garding’s ‘Weak by design? Diaspora engagement and institutional change in Croatia and 
Serbia’ (2018) focuses on the institutional change of diaspora institutions in sending states. 
Drawing on archival research and field interviews, she traces institutional emergence and 
change across six diaspora ministries in Croatia and Serbia in the period 1990–2015. Garding 
identifies two explanatory factors for the variation in the level and mechanisms of diaspora 
engagement across these countries, and within them over time. First, these institutions are 
often designed to be weak – symbolic rather than substantive – as indicated by small 
budgets, limited policymaking prerogatives, and overlap with other ministries and 
institutions that carry out diaspora policies. Second, while one might expect diaspora 
engagement policies to lie beyond partisan bickering, these policies and institutions can 
become highly politicized, and competition between parties and between intra-party 
factions drives change (Garding, 2018). 
 
Burgess’s ‘States or parties? Emigrant outreach and transnational engagement’ (2018) 
explores the transnational implications of emigrant outreach dominated by states or 
parties, by comparing two cases in which outreach is dominated by the state (Philippines 
and Mexico) and two by parties (Lebanon and Dominican Republic). Her main argument is 
that the types of outreach result in different trade-offs between electoral mobilization and 
partisan autonomy. State-led outreach encourages emigrants to transcend partisan 
divisions but does not mobilize overseas voters. Party-led outreach generates higher 
electoral turnout while reproducing and reinforcing sectarian or clientelist interest 
representation. She concludes by considering the implications of these differences for 
whether emigrants are likely to play a democratizing role in fragile democracies (Burgess, 
2018). 
 
Koinova’s ‘Endorsers, challengers, or builders? Political parties’ diaspora outreach in a 
postconflict state’ (2018b) focuses on differential party outreach. How do parties in 
government and opposition in a contested state reach out to their diasporas? Do their 
policies overlap or differ, and why? She focuses on transnational party engagement of 
diasporas within one of these states, Kosovo, and analyses the approaches of four parties, 
two in government and two in opposition. The article conceptualizes three types of 
extraterritorial party outreach – state-endorsing, statechallenging and party-building – 
pursued actively or passively. It develops a typological theory showing causal pathways by 
which types of approaches emerged in post-independence Kosovo. Parties that emerge 
from political movements with credentials from engagement with secessionism and warfare 
behave like parties in fully sovereign states, and are more likely to seek the diaspora 
through a state-endorsing or party-building approach, depending on whether they are in 
government or opposition. Parties that are newly institutionalized in the post-conflict polity 
seek to engage the diaspora through an active state-endorsing or state-challenging 
approach (Koinova, 2018b). 
 
Tsourapas’ ‘Authoritarian emigration states: Soft power and cross-border mobility in the 
Middle East’ (2018b) theorizes the foreign policy importance of cross-border mobility for 
‘authoritarian emigration states’, going against expectations that non-democracies 
invariably aim to restrict emigration or that they reach out to emigrant groups solely for 
developmental purposes. His analysis of Egyptian emigration policy between 1954–1970 
demonstrates how the ruling regime subsidised the emigration of high-skilled professionals 
across the Middle East and Africa for soft power purposes. In particular, he identifies how 
the Egyptian state engaged with migration as an instrument of cultural diplomacy and as a 
tool of disseminating developmental aid. Tsourapas makes a broader point regarding the 
interplay between foreign policy and cross-border mobility, while also sketching an evolving 
research agenda on authoritarian emigration states’ policy-making (Tsourapas, 2018b). 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The articles in this special issue on sending states’ engagement with migrants and diasporas 
abroad contribute to an emerging scholarship drawing on utilitarian, identity-based, 
governance and sociospatial explanations for diaspora policies. They also identify important 
questions and topics so far unexplored. These especially relate to how actors within sending 
states – parties, bureaucracies, civil society and non-state actors – behave extraterritorially, 
why and how their outreach is different, and how it is conditioned by statehood and regime-
based dynamics. The authors show that, in different countries, states or parties can lead the 
diaspora engagement processes (Burgess), and that parties can act in their own interest, or 
endorse and challenge states, especially in a post-conflict setting (Koinova). Even if 
interested in diaspora affairs, states can design diaspora-related institutions as deliberately 
weak (Garding), and engage citizens abroad on either civic or nationalist principles (Ireland, 
Koinova, Garding, Waterbury). 
 
Besides giving a better understanding of how the state, its sovereignty, capacity and links to 
nationalism shape extraterritorial diaspora politics, the authors also shed light on regime-
based dynamics. Authoritarian emigration states use labour migrants abroad in their foreign 
policy considerations (Tsourapas). Democratizing states can be more concerned with the 
well-being of their diasporas, and civil society organizations can intervene to protect them 
(Ireland). At critical junctures of democratization, states and parties can become more open 
to diasporas and seek to reshape their policies (Ireland, Burgess, Koinova). In sum, this 
special issue initiates a new conversation by delving deeper into the motivations of agents 
within sending states, and how their outreach is conditioned by the regimes in which they 
are embedded. 
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